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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
l

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

I

DOUGLAS A. CATTELAN,

:

Case No. 920576-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's "Motion to
Correct an Illegal Sentence" arising from defendant's conviction
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are:
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's
"Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence" on the ground that a five
years-to-life sentence of imprisonment is the legal sentence for
an aggravated robbery conviction?
which is reviewed for correctness.

This is a question of law
State v. Babbel. 813 P.2d 86,

87-88 (Utah 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct 883 (1992); Scharf v.
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel
in entering his negotiated guilty plea?

To establish an

ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show that his counsel
rendered a deficit performance in some demonstrable manner and
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial."

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U-S- 668, 692 (1984)).
This presents a mixed question of law and fact.

State

v. Temolin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 823
P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991).

The trial court's factual

findings must be given deference on appeal and only set aside if
clearly erroneous; its legal conclusion is reviewed for
correctness.

Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are determinative of
the issues in this case:
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1990).

Aggravated Robbery.

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1990).

Robbery.

(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 (1990). Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to
this title:
. . .

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury, or a
facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use
of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1990). Felony Conviction Indeterminate term of imprisonment - Increase of
sentence if firearm used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree,
for a term at not less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which
may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance
of the felony# the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree,
for a term at not less than one year nor more than
15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm
was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run
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consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to
run consecutively and not concurrently;
•

• •

(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was
used or involved in the accomplishment of the
felony and is convicted of another felony when a
firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment
of the felony shall/ in addition to any other
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an
indeterminate term to be not less than five nor
more than ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in separate informations with the
April 1990 aggravated robbery of a 7-Eleven convenience store and
the May 1990 aggravated robbery of a Texaco Short Stop store (R.
2, 27). While the two cases (district ct. nos. 901900317 and
901900318) were never formally consolidated, they were jointly
considered by the trial court (R. 16, 19, 23, 28-33, 36-37, 47,
137).
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered negotiated guilty
pleas, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970),
to the aggravated robbery of the 7-Eleven, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), and to a
reduced charge of robbery of the Texaco Short Stop, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990)
(R. 28-33, 122-138).

Defendant was sentenced to the applicable

statutory terms of imprisonment which sentences were stayed and
defendant was placed on probation under specified terms and
conditions (R. 36-37, 38, 39-41).
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No appeal was taken.

In May 1991 defendant admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and probation was revoked (R. 44, 46-47).
Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for five years-to-life on
the aggravated robbery conviction and one-to-fifteen years on the
robbery conviction; the sentences were imposed concurrently (R.
46-47).

No appeal was taken.
Five months later, defendant filed a "Motion to Correct

an Illegal Sentence," asserting that his aggravated robbery
sentence was illegal arid that the judgment and sentence should be
reduced to robbery (R. 52, 53-71).

The trial court denied the

motion in a memorandum decision (R. 74-76).
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the
denial of the motion (R. 147). The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the matter to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Douglas Cattelan, worked for the Internal
Revenue Service for nineteen years, serving as a section manager
for seven of those years (R. 25). For at least two years prior
to his arrest in this case, defendant drank alcohol excessively
and consumed large amounts of Robitussin cough syrup (R. 25).
Late at night on April 24, 1990, defendant robbed a 7Eleven convenience store (R. 27, 114). Using the telephone just
outside the store, defendant called the store clerk and demanded
that he put money in a bag and leave it outside next to a
dumpster (R. 102, 114). Defendant told the clerk, "If you
cooperate and don't panic, no one will get hurt.
5

I have a

shotgun pointed at your head" (R. 102, 127). The clerk explained
that he only had $20.00 in the till but asked if defendant wanted
something else.

Defendant responded, "Listen [expletive deleted]

I do have a gun pointed at your head, and I will kill you if you
don't do what I ask" (R. 102, 114-20, 127). The clerk quickly
filled a bag with money and merchandise and left it outside as
directed (R. 102, 114). He never observed defendant (id.).
Approximately one week later on May 2, 1990, defendant
robbed a Texaco Short Stop store.

Defendant picked up a box of

Robitussin cough syrup and walked over to the store's counter.
His hand was in his pocket and held in a way to appear to be a
gun (R. 60). Nervous and shaking, defendant asked for all the
money in the till (R. 60, 62, 64). When the clerks did not
respond, defendant said, "Give me all the [expletive deleted]
money.

All the [expletive deleted] money —

hurry up 'cause I'm

very nervous, too" (R. 62). The clerks gave him the money in the
till (R. 60).
Defendant was arrested the same day and confessed to
both robberies (R. 9, 114-20; Br. of Appellant at 2-3). In
connection with the 7-Eleven robbery, defendant claimed that he
had not told the clerk that he had a shotgun but admitted that he
got the clerk to comply by telling him that he would not get hurt
if he cooperated (R. 114-15).
Defendant initially entered not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity pleas (R. 14). Alienists were appointed to
examine defendant both for competency to stand trial and for any
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mental illness defense (R. 16). After these examinations were
completed, defendant did not further assert an insanity defense
and no issue relating to these examinations is raised on appeal.
Plea negotiations were initiated.

The State was

willing to reduce one count to robbery, a second degree felony,
which eliminated the possibility of an enhanced penalty for use
of a firearm under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 123-24,
127-28).

The prosecutor additionally agreed that he would take

no position at sentencing other than if prison sentences were
imposed, the prosecutor would recommend that they run
concurrently (R. 31). Defendant wanted the remaining aggravated
robbery charge restructured so that no additional term under the
firearm enhancement provision was possible.

The State agreed and

amended the aggravated robbery count by deleting any reference to
the use of a firearm and substituting the "serious bodily injury"
subsection of the aggravated robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302(l)(b) (R. 29, 123-29).
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered guilty pleas to the
aggravated robbery of the 7-Eleven and the robbery of the Texaco
Short Stop (R. 24, 28-33, 122-38).

The pleas were entered

pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970),
which permits a defendant to lawfully plead guilty to a crime he
factually did not commit to avoid risking conviction on another
more serious charge.
During the change of plea hearing, defendant's counsel
informed the trial court of the reasons for the Alford pleas:
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Your Honor, so that you'll understand the
course of the negotiations, you will recall
that at the time of the arraignment here
before you we had alienists appointed to
address certain mental competency issues.
Those were resolved in such a way that it was
my opinion that we did not have a legal
defense of any form of mental impairment.
Given that, although we did have
substantial kinds of issues that I thought
would be more appropriately raised with you
at sentencing, we entered into a negotiation
to accomplish a couple of things: one, to
satisfy two different jurisdictions that I
believe would be entered affecting both of
those; secondly, to remove any type of gun
enhancement because factually, in this case,
there was no weapon used. There was the
discussion about the potential of using a
weapon, but there was no weapon used. Or,
arguably, maybe not even a facsimile of a
weapon.
Also, if you'll note in the amended
information, 900317, there was no serious
bodily injury caused, but in order to
completely remove the gun enhancement, in
effect, to take away any discretion that the
Statute might give the Court because the
intent was that it not be there.
. . .

The amended information was put together
in this fashion under an Alfred [sic]
situation, and it's clear, and the State
would also indicate to you, that there was no
serious bodily injury, but in effect, this
was the only way we could accomplish what we
want to do and still keep it in one first
degree felony which is what the State
required that we do.
Given that, the negotiation is that
there will be a plea entered to each of these
informations, one first degree, one second
degree. No gun enhancement on either. And
that Mr. Daines will be recommending at the
time of sentencing that whatever sentence
[sic] occurs will run concurrently. Those
are the negotiations.
(R. 124-126).

The State concurred in these representations

stating that its reason for doing so was defendant's "problems"
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(R. 126). Counsel continued to explain to the court that in the
case of the Texaco robbery, defendant used his hand as a
"facsimile of a firearm" (R. 126). In the 7-Eleven robbery,
counsel stated that there was no gun seen as no face-to-face
encounter had occurred but that the threat to use a firearm had
been conveyed by telephone (R. 127).
The court asked defendant if he understood the
negotiations and defendant responded, "Yes, sir, I believe I do"
(R. 127). The court then stated:
Okay. You understand that they're reducing
one just to a simple robbery from — from a
[sic] aggravated robbery where there was
alleged to have been a weapon involved. You
understand that if there is a weapon involved
on an aggravated robbery, a firearm or
facsimile of a firearm — something that
looks like a firearm — that that [sic]
invests in the Court the discretion of
imposing a mandatory prison term.
(R. 127-128).

The court continued:

In other words, that I can order that you be
held in prison for a period of not less than
one and it could be up to five years.
Now, they're changing that to allege a
simple robbery which is punishable from one
to 15 years in the state penitentiary, and
how much you actually — how much time you
actually spend is up to the Board of Pardons.
And they can presumedly, I guess, release you
whenever they want to release you, in
essence.
With reference to the first degree, the
other charge, the aggravated robbery, where
it's alleged at the 7-Eleven, they're telling
me that you're going to admit that you caused
injury to somebody, but everybody agrees you
didn't cause injury to anyone.
The reason they want to do that is they
want to get the weapon enhancement out of
there, so I can't require you to spend a
minimum of up to five years in prison. And
9

the only way they can do that is by alleging
something that actually didn't happen.
And they feel that this would be to your
benefit. In other words, this is a good
negotiation. You're getting something out of
it, and the State's getting something out of
it. You're getting the possibility of five
to life, but once again, the Board of Pardons
will determined how long you actually spend,
whereas if I impose sentence with a weapon
enhancement, I could require you to spend at
least five years.
Do you understand that?
(R. 129-130).

Defendant responded "yes" and indicated that he

had discussed the matter with his attorney (R. 130). Defendant
stated that he did not use an actual weapon and the court again
explained, "I think everybody probably would not deny that that's
the case, but you understand that if you —

if there appears to

be a weapon, that that's what we call a facsimile" (R. 130).
Counsel repeated that in the 7-Eleven robbery, the threat of
using a weapon was the basis for the original aggravated count
(R. 130).
The court proceeded with its inquiry into the voluntary
and knowing nature of defendant's pleas to the first and second
degree felonies (R. 130-138).

No issue relating to compliance

with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is raised in this
appeal•
Prior to sentencing, defendant completed a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation (R. 34-35).

On November 11, 1990,

defendant was placed on probation (R. 36-41).
Defendant's alcohol problems continued despite his
intensive probation and on May 20, 1991, defendant admitted to
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violations of the terms of probation (R. 44, 49-50).

Probation

was revoked and defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of
imprisonment (R. 46-47; Partial Transcript of June 3, 1991
Sentencing).

No issue relating to the probation revocation is

raised in this appeal.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to correct what
he termed to be the "illegal sentence" imposed for the aggravated
robbery conviction (R. 52). He specifically asserted that he was
not moving to withdraw his plea to aggravated robbery but wanted
the conviction reduced to robbery because he "did commit the
crime of robbery a second degree felony and should be punished
for that crime, but should not be given a greater punishment for
a greater crime that he did not commit by Utah law" (R. 56). He
additionally alleged that his counsel had been ineffective
because counsel had given him bad advice concerning the
negotiated plea (R. 56). The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that the sentence for aggravated robbery was lawful
and that counsel had been effective (R. 74-76).

(A copy of the

memorandum decision is attached in the addendum to this brief.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While defendant entered guilty pleas to aggravated
robbery as a first degree felony and robbery as a second degree
felony, only the aggravated robbery conviction is challenged on
appeal•
In relation to this conviction, defendant asserts that
his sentence is "illegal" because the facts of the crime only
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constitute robbery and that his counsel was ineffective in
advising him to plead to aggravated robbery.

The trial court

properly rejected both arguments.
Defendant entered a plea bargain pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

The plea was entered to

an amended information charging aggravated robbery but which
deleted reference to firearm usage so as to avoid any possibility
of an enhanced sentence under the firearm enhancement statute,
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1990).

Defendant does not directly

challenge the voluntary and knowing nature of his plea but
contends that, as a matter of law, the facts would not support a
conviction of aggravated robbery.

Defendant does not seek the

withdrawal of his plea to aggravated robbery but its reduction to
robbery.
Whether the facts of the crime fully support the plea
is irrelevant to a consideration of an Alford plea.

For, a

defendant may lawfully plead guilty to a crime he did not
factually commit to avoid risking conviction on another more
serious charge.

As long as the negotiated plea was entered with

knowledge of its legal consequences, the plea is valid.

Here,

defendant does not claim that he failed to understand that he was
pleading guilty to first and second degree versions of the
robbery statutes in order to avoid enhanced penalties.

As such,

the plea to aggravated robbery is valid, irrespective of whether
he could have been convicted of that charge.

Since the sentence

of imprisonment of five years-to-life is the statutory sentence

12

for aggravated robbery, the trial court correctly concluded that
defendant's sentence is legal.
Defendant secondarily attempts to attack the validity
of his conviction by claiming that his counsel was ineffective in
advising him to enter an Alford plea to aggravated robbery.

To

establish ineffectiveness in the context of a guilty plea,
defendant must show both that the advice of his counsel
concerning the plea was not "within the range of competency
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,11 and that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial."

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 59 (1985) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).

The trial

court correctly concluded that the facts alleged by the State
provided a legal basis for the charges and, therefore, defense
counsel's plea negotiation to minimize the applicable penalties
was not deficient.
Further, defendant asserts that he does not wish either
of his pleas to be withdrawn but only seeks the reduction of the
aggravated robbery conviction to robbery, a charge defendant
admits that he would have pleaded guilty to under any
circumstances.

In essence, defendant is claiming that he is

entitled to a better plea bargain.

Therefore, even assuming

arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant^has
failed to establish prejudice in the sixth amendment sense.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS-TO-LIFE ON
HIS CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS
LAWFUL
Defendant has consistently stated that he is not
attempting to withdraw his guilty pleas or otherwise vacate the
pleas as involuntarily or unknowingly entered (Br. of Appellant
at 19, 21; R. 56, 58). Instead, defendant claims that his
aggravated robbery conviction should be reduced to robbery, as a
matter of law, in that he "should not be given a greater
punishment for a greater crime that he did not commit by Utah
law" (Brief of App. at 19; R. 56). No issue is raised concerning
the validity of defendant's second conviction for robbery.
Citing rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(allowing correction of an "illegal" sentence at any time),
defendant's first ground for reduction of his conviction is that
the sentence for aggravated robbery is unlawful (Br. of App. at
4-5; R. 52-56).

As the trial court correctly concluded, this

argument is meritless (R. 74-76).

(See addendum for a copy of

the memorandum decision denying defendant's motion.)

So long as

defendant's plea to aggravated robbery is valid, the legal
sentence of imprisonment is five years-to-life.

Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-302(2) (1990) (designating aggravated robbery as a first
degree felony); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1990) (providing
that the statutory penalty for conviction of a first degree
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felony is imprisonment for five years-to-life).

(The full text

of all statutory provisions is set forth, supra, at 2-4.)
Contrary to defendant's assertions, due process does
not preclude a defendant from entering a guilty plea to a crime
for which he could not be convicted and factually did not commit.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970); Hurst v.
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989).

Here, the record clearly

reflects that defendant's pleas to the amended charges of
aggravated robbery and robbery were entered pursuant to Alford to
avoid the possibility of imposition of mandatory enhanced
penalties if the trial court found that a "firearm or a facsimile
or representation of a firearm" had been used in the commission
of either robbery (R. 123-30).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.

It is also unchallenged that defendant was informed of the
applicable penalties for the first and second degree felony
offenses to which he was pleading (R. 28-29, 128-30).

Since the

record establishes that defendant understood the consequences of
his Alford plea to aggravated robbery, he is not now entitled to
a lesser sentence or to withdraw his plea on the basis that he
did not factually commit the crime to which he pled.
P.2d at 1038.

Hurst, 777

It is sufficient that the plea, entered to avoid

the possibility of a harsher sentence, is of the same genre of
crime of which he was originally charged and does not distort the
nature of the criminal conduct involved.
1038.
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Hurst, 777 P.2d at

Defendant received the benefit of his bargain.

The

court specified in the judgment that defendant was not subject to
an enhanced penalty for firearm usage and defendant has received
none (R. 39)* By limiting the State's position at sentencing and
admitting his general culpability and need for treatment,
defendant was successful in initially avoiding prison and
receiving probation.

This opportunity to address his alcohol

problems was another of the admitted goals in entering the pleas
(R. 25-26/ 38-41f 125). The benefit defendant received by the
plea bargain was only undone by defendant when he violated his
probation and the now challenged sentence of imprisonment was
imposed

(Br. of App. at 1; R. 44). However, since the five-to-

life sentence does not exceed the sentence statutorily proscribed
for aggravated robbery and no abuse of discretion is otherwise
alleged, the sentence is valid.

State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052/

1054-55 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987f
988 (Utah 1986)).

Accord Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1038.
POINT II

DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IN ENTERING HIS NEGOTIATED GUILTY
PLEA TO AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
While defendant labeled his motion as a "Motion to
Correct an Illegal Sentence/1' the trial court correctly realized
that defendant was actually alleging that his counsel was
ineffective in advising him to plead guilty (R. 75; addendum).
For this reasonf the trial court ignored the caption of
defendant's motion and apparently treated the argument as a
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petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (id.)*

See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,

473-74 (Utah App. 1991) (a defendant who asserts that he should
not have been convicted of a certain degree of crime is not
alleging that his sentence is illegal but that his conviction
should be vacated).

The court explicitly declined to rule on any

applicable procedural bar and simply considered the merits of
defendant's pro se argument (R. 75). Because the merits of the
ineffectiveness claim were reviewed below, the State will address
this argument on appeal. ££. State v. Belcrard. 830 P.2d 264, 266
(Utah 1992) (the trial court's disregard of a procedural bar and
ruling on the merits of a claim preserves the issue for
appeal).l
To prove ineffectiveness of counsel in connection with
the entry of a guilty plea, a defendant must establish not only
that the advice of his counsel was not "within the range of
competency demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," but also
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted

1

Defendant also summarily alleges that "[f]or the prosecutor
to push the greater punishment for his own gain was a violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments" (Br. of App. at 19; R. 56).
Presumptively, this is the same argument that defendant advances in
support of his ineffectiveness claim: As a matter of law, there
was no basis for the aggravated charges or potential firearm
enhancements. Implicitly, the trial court rejected this argument
in concluding that a legal basis existed for the charges (R. 75).
For purposes of this brief, no separate analysis is required. If
a legal basis exists for the charges such that defendant's counsel
was effective, necessarily there was no misconduct in prosecuting
the charges.
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on going to trial."

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 59

(1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692
(1984)).
Defendant claims that his counsel rendered bad advice,
and presumedly deficient performance, by advising him that he
could be lawfully charged with two aggravated robbery counts and
potentially faced mandatory penalty enhancements based on his
threats of use of a firearm in the 7-Eleven robbery and his use
of his hand to create the impression of a weapon in the Texaco
robbery.

The difficulty with defendant's argument is that if he

established the constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel, his
pleas should be vacated and the matter remanded for trial on the
original charges.

Id.

Yet, defendant seeks only to reduce the

7-Eleven aggravated robbery conviction to robbery and leave the
Texaco robbery conviction undisturbed.

Defendant concedes that,

irrespective of the advice of counsel, he would not have
proceeded to trial and would have simply insisted on a better
plea bargain (Br. of App, at 2-3, 19, 21).
In this framework, the issues are: Was defendant's
counsel's advice regarding the acceptance or rejection of the
proposed Alford plea bargain within the range of competency
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases?

And if not, can

prejudice as defined under the sixth amendment be found where
defendant does not claim that, but for the deficient performance,
he would have proceeded to trial?
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The sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial does not
extend to fair plea bargains.

State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062,

1068 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah
1985) and State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987)).
For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to address
claims of ineffectiveness predicated on counsel's performance in
the plea bargain process unless the claim of deficient
performance concerns counsel's failure to do an act procedurally
required.

Id.
Here, defendant argues that counsel's interpretation of

the applicable statutory law was incorrect and, therefore, his
advice regarding the benefits of the plea bargain was deficient
(Br. of App. at 19-21; R. 56-57).2

But, an attorney's errors in

judgment concerning the strength of the case or likelihood of
conviction are matters of trial strategy and tactics generally
exempted from sixth amendment scrutiny.
1066.

Colonna, 766 P.2d at

Only where there is no "tactical or strategic

justification for his conduct of the trial" will the error in
judgment be considered constitutionally deficient.

Id..

In the

context of plea negotiations, this exemption is strictly applied
and appellate courts will generally refuse to review the "skill
and competency of counsel in the negotiation process or in advice

2

The record does not contain the specific advice given
defendant by counsel. However, it is evident that counsel believed
that the State's evidence could support the charges (R. 123-30).
It is also clear that counsel recognized that an argument existed
that no "facsimile" had been used (R. 125).
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given regarding the acceptance or rejection of a proposed plea
bargain."

3x1. at 1068.
The trial court, however, considered the claim on the

merits by analyzing whether, as a matter of law, the alleged
conduct fell within the aggravated robbery and penalty
enhancement provisions (R. 75; addendum).

If the informations

were supportable, then counsel was effective in negotiating the
pleas; if not, the plea bargain was merely illusory.3
The trial court concluded that the 1989 amended
aggravated robbery statute included a threat to use a firearm
without proof of the actual existence of a weapon (R. 75).
Implicitly, the court found that either the use of defendant's
hand to create the facsimile of a weapon during the Texaco
robbery or the oral representation that a firearm would be used
in the 7-Eleven robbery, provided a basis for possible firearm
enhancement penalties (R. 75, 127-30).

Since there existed a

legal basis for the charges, the trial court concluded:
The negotiation to remove a firearms
enhancement and an Alford plea based upon
that consideration therefore would be
effective and not subject to challenge at
this stage.
(R. 75; addendum).
Defendant challenges the trial court's conclusion by
citing State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), and State v.
Hartman, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that a
3

While defendant only directly attacks the aggravated robbery
conviction, the circumstances surrounding both pleas must be
considered in any evaluation of the plea bargain.
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verbal threat to use a firearm cannot support an "aggravated"
charge unless the threat is made in a face-to-face encounter (Br.
of App. at 10-14).

Similarly, defendant argues that the use of

his hand to represent a firearm cannot support an "aggravated"
charge unless the hand gesture is accompanied with a threat to
use a dangerous weapon (id.).

Defendant's argument is not

supported by the language of the current statutes.
In Suniville, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a
verbal threat to use a weapon, without more, did not constitute
aggravated robbery.

741 P.2d at 965. This interpretation was

dictated and limited by the language of the then existing
statute, which read:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1978).

The court opined that if

the legislature had intended a verbal threat to constitute
aggravated robbery, the legislature would have added language
focusing on the perception of the victim who is threatened with a
concealed weapon rather than language exclusively limited to the
nature of the weapon used.

Suniville, 741 P.2d at 963-64.

Just such a subjective approach was adopted in 1989.
In response to Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated
robbery statute to read, in pertinent part:
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A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he uses or

threatens

to use a dangerous weapon.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1990) (italics added).
At the same time, the legislature amended the statutory
definition of dangerous weapon.

Prior to 1989, a deadly or

dangerous weapon had been defined as "anything that in the manner
of its use or intended use is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (1978).

But with

the inclusion of "threats" in the amended aggravated robbery
statute, the legislature now defined dangerous weapon to include
any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury or "a
facsimile or representation" of such an item and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use
of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990).
Contrary to defendant's assertions, in expanding the
scope of the aggravated robbery statute to include "threats to
use a dangerous weapon," the Utah legislature clearly intended to
include any "expression of an intention to inflict injury on
another" whether communicated by action, conduct or words.

State

v. Hartman, 783 P.2d at 546. Under the subjective approach, the
determining factor is not limited to whether the perpetrator
actually uses or displays a weapon; the aggravated element may be
predicated simply on the fear instilled in the victim by the
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threat to use such a weapon.

Id. at 547. Accord State v. Adams,

830 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah App. 1992) ("[tjhreatening to use a
dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery, regardless
of whether one actually possesses such a weapon, is sufficient
for a charge of aggravated robbery").
Despite the plain language of the statutes and the
Hartman-Adams' holdings, defendant argues that only a face-toface threat will support an aggravated robbery charge.

But the

language of the current statutes negate this contention.
Aggravated robbery is defined as including (1) incidents where
the robber's use or apparent intended use of a dangerous weapon
or its "facsimile or representation" "leads the victim to
reasonably believe" the item may be used, or (2) incidents where
the robber represents to the victim, by words or conduct, that he
is in control of a dangerous weapon.
and 76-1-601(5).

Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-302

In either situation, the actual observation or

existence of the weapon is immaterial.

Adams, 830 P.2d at 313.

In interpreting the pre-1989 statutes, the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that "facsimile" means no more than its
dictionary meaning of "making a copy, imitation."
Turner, 572 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1977).

State v.

No Utah case has

interpreted "representation" in the robbery weapon context.
However, following the Turner approach, "representation" should
be interpreted by its dictionary meaning as "a statement of
facts, allegations or arguments, especially one intended to
influence action, persuade hearers, make protest."
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Webster's New

World Dictionary.

Applying these definitions, use of a dangerous

weapon includes use of a real weapon, use of a copy or imitation
of such a weapon, and statements and conduct which convey that
the perpetrator has such a weapon.

Accord In Re R.D.S, 777 P.2d

532, 537 (Utah App. 1989) (statutory language should be given its
"ordinary, plain meaning" ); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d
428, 430 (Utah 1989) ("in construing a statute, all words are
presumed to have been used advisedly and that construction is
favored which gives effect to all of its provisions").
Similarly, defendant contends his conduct, as a matter
of law, could not justify the imposition of penalty enhancements
for use of a firearm and, therefore, his counsel was deficient
for considering the impact of enhanced penalties during the plea
negotiations.

Defendant's argument is essentially the same as

discussed above in that he claims that the firearm enhancement
provision is inapplicable where there is no proof of the use of
an actual weapon.

Like the dangerous weapon statute, the penalty

enhancement provision uses the terms "firearm or a facsimile or
the representation of a firearm."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203

(1990) (See complete text, supra, at 3-4). For the reasons
previously discussed, the use of the term "representation"
includes within it, verbal and physical actions of the robber
which convey that he is in control of a dangerous weapon.
Since the State's evidence supported the aggravated
charges and exposed defendant to possible increased penalties for
firearm usage, the trial court properly concluded that
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defendant's counsel was effective for entering into plea
negotiations.

Given the evidence, including defendant's

confessions and lack of defense (R. 124), and his wish to "get
his life straighten out" (R.25-26), counsel reasonably minimized
defendant's criminal exposure.
Defendant has not established that counsel's assistance
in the ensuing Alford pleas was ineffective or that defendant has
been prejudiced in any constitutional sense.
474 U.S. at 59.

Hill v. Lockhart,

Since the guilty pleas obtained lesser sentences

that he would have received if convicted as charged, defendant
"received what he bargained for."

Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1038.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and
sentence for aggravated robbery should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q/Qttay of November,
1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General-^

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney
General
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ADDENDUM
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D
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UT^£ jy^ \l fid 9 UO
STATE OF UTAH,
\

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

vs.

\

DOUGLAS A. CATTELAN,

Case No.

Defendant.

901900317

JUN 1 2 1992

Defendant's motion to correct a sentence is denied.
Factually,
negotiation.

the

defendant's motion

arises

from

a plea

He had been charged with an Aggravated Robbery

through the threatened use of a firearm.

That charge had been

amended to allege instead "serious bodily injury" to avoid the
firearms enhancement which was attendant to the prior charge.
The defendant entered an "Alford" plea to that charge, based
upon

the

fact

that

everyone

had

agreed,

no

one

had

been

injured.
The Court had in due course sentenced the defendant to a
term in prison of 5 years to life.
The defendant believes that sentence should be corrected
to reflect a second degree felony, since that is the offense
which he felt the state could prove.
The Court cannot correct that sentence, since 5 years to
life is appropriate for the charge for which he stands convicted.

0)74

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 901900317
Page 2
The inquiry does not conclude at that point in view of
the defendant's concern with the negotiation.

If the offense he

committed was a Second Degree Felony and in the negotiation he
pled to a First Degree, that may well constitute grounds for
concern.
The State alleged that the defendant called the victim on
the phone and told him he had a gun pointed at his head and if
he didn't put money and merchandise outside by a dumpster he
would kill him.

While the defendant denied that statement, that

was the basis for the States filing of the Aggravated Robbery
charge.

The question is whether the mere threat of the use of a

firearm is sufficient to make a case of Aggravated Robbery, or
if the State's burden would require some evidence of the actual
existence of a firearm.
The Court concludes in view of the history of the section
in question, the threat of use of a firearm is sufficient to
make out an Aggravated Robbery.
firearms

enhancement

and

an

The negotiation to remove a

Alford

plea

based

upon

that

consideration therefore would be effective and not subject to
challenge at this stage.
In view of this ruling the court has not considered the
procedural aspects relating to the defendant's motion.
DATED this

LL day of June, 1992*

